Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Philosophy Theses

Department of Philosophy

Summer 8-1-2012

Against Collective Consequentialism
James J. DiGiovanni
Georgia State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses

Recommended Citation
DiGiovanni, James J., "Against Collective Consequentialism." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2012.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/2824553

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Theses by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
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ABSTRACT
In this paper I argue that Liam Murphy’s collective consequentialism—emphasizing
fairness instead of maximization of value—is not an adequate response to the demandingness
objections levied at consequentialism. Especially since Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and
Morality,” many have objected that consequentialism is far too demanding, particularly
concerning our obligations of assistance to those in extreme poverty. Murphy thinks that the
problem is not that consequentialism is necessarily too demanding; it is that, in our nonideal
world of partial compliance, consequentialism is too demanding on those who comply with its
dictates. I hope to show that Murphy’s theory is unsatisfying. I will not defend any particular
version of consequentialism over alternative consequentialist theories, nor will I defend
consequentialism over alternative non-consequentialist moral theories. My aim is far narrower:
To show that those who accept a broadly consequentialist account of morality have little reason
to accept Murphy’s collective consequentialism.
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CHAPTER 1- MURPHY, CONSEQUENTIALISM, AND DEMANDINGNESS
1.1 Consequentialism and its Demands
In his discussion of world poverty, Peter Singer begins with a now well-known thought
experiment:
On my way to giving a lecture, I pass a shallow ornamental pond and notice that a
small child has fallen in and is in danger of drowning. I look around to see where
the parents, or babysitter, are, but to my surprise, I see that there is no one else
around. It seems that it is up to me to make sure that the child doesn't drown.
Would anyone deny that I ought to wade in and pull the child out? This will
mean getting my clothes muddy, ruining my shoes and either cancelling my
lecture or delaying it until I can find something dry to change into; but compared
with the avoidable death of a child none of these things are significant.1
Almost all consequentialists, and many non-consequentialists, accept Singer's conclusion here as
uncontroversial. The principle it rests upon is clear: “If it is in our power to prevent something
very bad happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, we
ought to do it.”2
But this example, while it seems uncontroversial, is famously deceptive. What appears to
be a simple principle would actually be incredibly demanding, and would significantly alter our
lives. A relatively3 affluent individual could give up portions of her income spent on a nice car,
dining out, and so on, in order to save the lives of children through charitable donations. If a
person is willing to ruin their nice clothing to save a drowning child, she should be just as
willing not to buy these items in the first place, and instead donate the money to a charitable
organization to save a starving or sick child's life.
1
2
3

Peter Singer, Practical Ethics: Third Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 199.
Singer (2011), 199.
Relative, of course, to those in extreme poverty. This leaves almost all people in developed, western, liberal
democracies as relatively affluent.
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1.2 The Demandingness Objections
Before discussing the attempted solutions to the problem of demandingness, I must first
show why demandingness is typically thought to be such a problem for consequentialism, even
by those who consider themselves consequentialists.4 The demandingness objections I will focus
on are aimed at maximizing act-consequentialism, or what Murphy calls the “optimizing
principle of beneficence.”5 According to this version of consequentialism, morality “requires us
to keep beneﬁting others until the point where further efforts would burden us as much as they
would help the others.”6
Murphy contends that although this requirement “has the virtue of simplicity, the
demands it makes strike just about everyone as absurd—as we say, a principle that makes such
demands ‘just couldn’t be right’.”7 Shelly Kagan suggests that the problem is that “to live in
accordance with such demands would drastically alter my life. In a sense, neither my time, nor
my goods, nor my plans would be my own....The claim is deeply counterintuitive.”8 Kagan,
Murphy, and almost all consequentialists (and many non-consequentialists) would agree that just
because a claim is counterintuitive does not mean that it is wrong. Instead, such a deeply
counterintuitive claim merely warrants further analysis.
4

5
6

7
8

Demandingness objections to consequentialism have become quite prevalent in the literature over the last forty
years, and I will discuss only a few contemporary formulations. Demandingness objections, though, can be traced
as far back as William Godwin, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick. See Brad Hooker’s Ideal Code, Real
World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 149 fn. All references to Hooker will be to this work.
I will refer to “maximizing act-consequentialism” as simply “act-consequentialism.”
Liam Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 6. All references
to Murphy will be to this work.
Murphy, 6.
Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 2.
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Objections raised to consequentialism in this vein are often conflated and lumped under a
single “demandingness objection” umbrella. These objections, though, should be divided into
three distinct types: demandingness objections, integrity/alienation objections, and confinement
objections. While these objections sound very different, in what follows I will offer more
precise accounts of the three objections, hoping to make clear why they are often conflated.9
The demandingness objection, when properly differentiated from the other similar objections, is
the most straightforward of the three. As Singer puts it, in referring specifically to famine relief
in Bengal,
It might be thought that this argument has an absurd consequence. Since the
situation appears to be that very few people are likely to give substantial amounts,
it follows that I and everyone else in similar circumstances ought to give as much
as possible, that is, at least up to the point at which by giving more one would
begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one's dependents - perhaps even
beyond this point to the point of marginal utility, at which by giving more one
would cause oneself and one's dependents as much suffering as one would prevent
in Bengal.10
Those who view this consequence as absurd are making the standard demandingness objection.
These objectors respond with an argument in basically this form:
If the optimizing principle of beneficence is correct, morality requires agents to
reduce themselves to the point of marginal utility.
Morality does not require that agents reduce themselves to the point of marginal
utility.
Therefore, the optimizing principle of beneficence is not correct.
One philosopher’s modus ponens, as the saying goes, is another philosopher’s modus tollens.
9

Murphy also specifies demandingness objections in this way, as does Paul Hurley in “Fairness and Beneficence,”
Ethics 113.4 (2003), 845.
10
Peter Singer, “Famine Affluence and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1.1 (1972), 229-243. “Marginal
utility” is the term used by Singer, so I will use it here for consistency, leaving aside whether Singer uses the term
properly. Following Singer, then, we can use “the point of marginal utility” to mean “the point at which giving
more would cause oneself and one’s dependents as much suffering as one would prevent.”

4
The optimizing principle brings us to such absurd consequences that the optimizing principle
itself must be wrong. A tenable moral theory, critics say, does not require that agents reduce
themselves to the point of marginal utility, i.e., a tenable moral theory does not make such
excessive demands. There are various ways in which these critics have argued that morality
does not make such excessive demands, both from a consequentialist and non-consequentialist
perspective. For our purposes here, we need not explore these arguments. Instead, we need be
aware that they exist.11
The integrity/alienation objections are proposed most forcefully by Bernard Williams
(who uses the term “integrity”) and Peter Railton (who uses the term “alienation”). The integrity
and alienation objections are not exactly the same, but because they point to the same general
problem I will group them together here. Railton states the problem as follows: “Living up to
the demands of morality may bring with it alienation—from one's personal commitments, from
one's feelings or sentiments, from other people, or even from morality itself.”12 Railton defines
alienation “roughly as a kind of estrangement, distancing, or separateness (not necessarily
consciously attended to) resulting in some sort of loss (not necessarily consciously noticed).”13
Consequentialism, Railton argues, is “all-consuming” and forces out our commitments to other
ends.14 A person who loves to play soccer, and gets much satisfaction from playing soccer,
would likely have to give up this activity in favor of whatever would have the best

11

See, for example, Samuel Scheffler’s Human Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch. 1-2.
Peter Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 13.2
(1984), 134.
13
Railton, 134.
14
Railton, 145.
12
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consequences, considered impartially.15
Williams makes a similar argument, focusing especially on an agent’s personal projects
and commitments.16 He contends that due to the demandingness of maximization,
consequentialist moral theories force individuals to abandon most of their most basic individual
commitments. Individuals define themselves through these personal commitments—to friends,
family, non-utility maximizing social causes, intellectual, cultural, or creative pursuits—what
Williams calls “identity-conferring commitments.” An identity-conferring commitment is, for
Williams, “the condition of my existence, in the sense that unless I am propelled forward by the
conatus of desire, project and interest, it is unclear why I should go on at all.”17 A moral theory
that fails to give pride of place to identity-conferring commitments—and utilitarianism of the
optimizing sort is used as a paradigmatic example—is deeply flawed.
A nice formulation of the confinement objection is raised by Michael Slote.18 This
objection refers to the limiting of one’s options by a moral theory such as utilitarianism. For the
optimizing principle of beneficence, the right action is the action that brings consequences as
good as any alternative option. It seems that the optimizing principle of beneficence allows for

15

An exception could be made if, for example, playing a game of soccer would keep the individual in peak physical
condition and allow her to perform her job better, earn more money, donate more money, and therefore be in
accordance with the optimizing principle of beneficence. Even if this is sometimes the case, it seems plausible to
say that many of our “identity-conferring commitments” would be problematic for the optimizing principle of
beneficence.
16
Bernard Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” in J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and
Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), Section 5.
17
Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character, and Morality” in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 12.
18
Slote, Common Sense Morality and Consequentialism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), ch. 2. See also
Dan Brock’s “Defending Moral Options,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51.4 (1991), pp. 909-913.
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only one possible action.19 In the obvious case, the optimizing principle of beneficence demands
that an agent use her money in the most efficient way possible, leaving the agent with one choice
of what to do with her financial resources.
The demands of the optimizing principle of beneficence go even further than dictating
what an individual does with her income. This further problem is the emphasis of the
confinement objection. It appears that according to the optimizing principle, one would have to
not only donate substantial portions of one's income, which is drastic enough, but also alter
nearly every major life decision. “A successful college student in the United States who is
choosing between law school and ... pursuing graduate work in philosophy ... should certainly
choose law school, and once graduated should work for the highest paying law firm she can.”20
The only permissible option available, if morality demands that we optimize beneficence, will
for the vast majority be the highest paying career possible, the goal being to earn more money
and make greater charitable contributions. One can easily imagine what the adoption of this
principle would do to the choices of those interested in low paying but personally fulfilling
careers.21 This certainly has significant overlap with the alienation problem, but we can see how
the limiting of options causes its own problems as well.
Options are equally limited in our non-professional lives. The individual who
19

Much has been written on this issue that cannot be discussed here. Actual ties likely do not exist, but, from an
agent’s perspective, there will be many situations in which she lacks epistemic access to what the optimizing
action is, and is thus (many utilitarians would say) left with a choice between several actions. This point may
weaken the confinement objection in some situations, but it seems unlikely that it can defeat the confinement
objection completely.
20
Murphy, 27.
21
Along with Murphy, Singer, and most consequentialists, I here take for granted that the utility comparison can be
made between the loss incurred by a person who would have been a happy philosopher choosing to be a miserable
lawyer, and the gains of those receiving the charitable contributions of the miserable lawyer.
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participates in a weekend soccer league would increase overall utility by quitting the league and
instead working more hours, or volunteering. If the individual volunteered at a local soup
kitchen, that too would likely be problematic, for the individual surely has better, more efficient
options of increasing the well-being of others. This eliminating of options would continue until
the agent is finally and consistently only engaging in the optimizing action at any given time.
When our options are so severely limited, our lives are just as severely confined. This limits
what Slote calls an individual's “moral autonomy,” or the “moral permissibility of choosing
among a variety of possible actions.”22

1.3 Murphy's Collective Consequentialism
Liam Murphy offers an insightful response to these serious problems. It is important to
first note that, as suggested by the title of Murphy's book—Moral Demands in Nonideal
Theory—his concern is with nonideal theory.23 That is, Murphy's concern is with the moral
demands made in a world of partial compliance. The main question Murphy addresses is the
question of “what a given person is required to do in circumstances where at least some others
are not doing what they are required to do.”24 Murphy's theory, as we will see, is built upon the
uncontroversial idea that many moral agents fail to comply with consequentialism, leaving
compliance quite low. It is likely more accurate to say that moral agents, as a whole, are far
closer to full noncompliance than to full compliance. Because Murphy's focus is nonideal
22

Slote, Ch. 2.
For more on the difference between ideal and nonideal theory, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 8-9, 245-246.
24
Murphy, 5.
23
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theory, that, too, will be my focus.
Murphy argues that although the optimizing principle of beneficence appears absurd
because of its demandingness, the alleged problem is actually “no problem at all.”25 Murphy,
instead of solving the problem of over-demandingness, seeks to “undermine its force.”26 “We
need to remind ourselves,” Murphy says, “that no moral theory, utilitarian or otherwise, is
necessarily extremely confining and that, on the other hand, all familiar theories are potentially
extremely confining.”27 Consequentialism itself is not demanding until we consider the nonideal
case of partial compliance or near noncompliance.
To show that consequentialism is not necessarily over-demanding, or at least that it is not
necessarily any more demanding than other moral theories, Murphy contrasts it with deontology.
“There are possible circumstances,” he writes, “in which the mostly negative prescriptions of
standard deontological accounts will be extremely confining.”28 To show this, Murphy uses
several examples. The first features an American parent with a chronically ill child and no health
insurance. The special obligation to care for the child leaves the parent in much the same
position as the optimizing principle of beneficence would, only the duty is to a specific person.
The parent must seek employment that garners the highest wages to spend on the medical bills.
Thus, Murphy claims that alternative moral theories with positive duties can be just as
demanding as consequentialism.
Negative deontological requirements can be incredibly demanding as well. “If I am told
25

Murphy, 74.
Murphy, 8.
27
Murphy, 31. It is safe to assume that Murphy says the same about a moral theory being potentially vs. necessarily
alienating and demanding as well.
28
These two example are taken from Murphy, 28.
26
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to cooperate with a murderous regime...ordinary deontological requirements may leave me with
one or two permissible options—presumably flight or acceptance of my own demise.”29 In using
this second example, Murphy concludes that it is “wrong to think that extreme confinement was
a feature of just positive requirements, such as special obligations [in the case of the sick child]
or beneficence [in the case of consequentialist and deontological duties of assistance].”30
Whether or not we accept his comparison between deontological and consequentialist demands,
the collective principle of beneficence is still highly problematic for reasons I will show in the
following sections. This is especially clear when we remember that the focus of this paper is the
internal debates of consequentialism, and not a defense of consequentialism over deontology.
The real issue with the demands of the optimizing principle is not that they are too
demanding, Murphy contends, but that they are too demanding on those who comply. So the
problem is not demandingness per se, but unfairness. Take, as a prominent example, duties of
assistance to those in extreme poverty. If each individual who can afford to offer assistance did
so, the demands on each of us would not be very great at all. There would be no worry of
alienation, confinement, or demandingness. But Murphy's focus, remember, is nonideal theory.
Sure, if we had full compliance demandingness would not be a problem. But, in our nonideal
world, we have nowhere near full compliance. So the demands are not met by all, but rather
only by those in the very small minority who choose to comply with the moral demands.
Following Derek Parfait, Murphy labels these compliers, interested in “free-lance good-doing” in

29
30

Murphy, 28.
Murphy, 28.
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a world of near low compliance, “pure do-gooders.”31 The burden placed on do-gooders is
unfair. It is problematic that those who attempt to follow the dictates of morality—those who
attempt to do the most good—are left confined, alienated, and nearly as poor as those they are
attempting to help.
“If I am complying with the optimizing principle but others are not,” Murphy continues,
“I not only have to do my own fair share. I have to take on as much of the shares of the
noncomplying others as is optimal as well.”32 Because the concern of Murphy and the other
consequentialists discussed here is the nonideal world of partial compliance, the demandingness
objection cannot be avoided by stating that consequentialism is too demanding in theory.
Whether or not consequentialism is more or less demanding in theory than any form of
deontology or other moral theory is, for my purposes and Murphy's, insignificant.
Before we continue, more needs to be said about what Murphy means by the term “fair
share.” For Murphy, fairness and equality are very closely linked. He divides fairness into two
types, formal fairness and substantive fairness, and uses the concept of formal fairness in
discussion a fair distribution of compliance effects. Formal fairness “requires that a distribution
be equal unless there are good grounds for departing from equality.”33 Formal fairness is
incomplete, but it does “tell us something, namely, that equal distributions matter, and that
departures from equality require a reason we can acknowledge as having weight.”34 In his full
discussion of fairness (especially in contrasting formal and substantive fairness), Murphy makes
31

Murphy, 13, 22. See also Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 30.
Murphy, 7.
33
Murphy, 107.
34
Murphy, 108.
32
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it clear that the departure from a fair (and thus equal) distribution of compliance effects requires
a reason so weighty that this departure is most often unjustified.35 So, most important to our
discussion here, Murphy believes that in the distribution of compliance effects, “formal fairness
and fairness as equality coincide.”36 I will not argue against Murphy’s specific account of
fairness; rather, I will assume his account of fairness is correct and see where it leads us.
Murphy's response to this problem is a form of rule-consequentialism he calls “collective
consequentialism.”37 “[T]he idea” of what Murphy calls the compliance condition, he writes, “is
that the demands on a complying person should not exceed what they would be under full
compliance.”38 Here is Murphy’s full articulation of the compliance condition:
An agent-neutral moral principle should not increase its demands on agents as
expected compliance with the principle by other agents decreases. Demands on
an agent under partial compliance should not exceed what they would be (all
other aspects of her situation remaining the same) under full compliance from
now on.39
This collective consequentialist account proceeds in what can be seen as three distinct stages.40
First, the agent conceives of a world of perfect compliance in which everyone acts in accordance
with the demands of the optimizing principle of beneficence. In the second stage, the agent
calculates (perhaps only roughly) what her level of well-being would be in the world of perfect
compliance. In the third and final stage, the agent considers what actions would, in the actual
world of imperfect compliance, make people best off without making the agent herself worse off
35

See the full discussion of formal and substantive fairness in Murphy, 107-112.
Murphy, 112.
37
Murphy more often calls it “the collective principle of beneficence.” For the sake of consistency, I will just refer
to his theory as “collective consequentialism,” as he also does at times. He also uses “the optimizing principle of
beneficence” to refer to maximizing act-consequentialism.
38
Murphy, 7.
39
Murphy, 77.
40
Murphy does not explicitly offer these stages, but the stages make his conception clearer.
36
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than she would have been under perfect compliance. These actions, then, are what morality
demands of her according to collective consequentialism. She is required to do her fair share,
but not any more than her fair share.
Murphy's proposal allows us to avoid many problems faced by consequentialists. The
worry of “do-gooders” being forced to pick up the slack is eliminated. A robust sense of fairness
is put at the forefront.41 If every relatively affluent person gave their fair share to aid those in
extreme poverty, they would simply not face the problems of extreme demandingness,
confinement, and alienation. Murphy's conception of fairness concerns specifically the fairness
of the distribution of responsibility. “If there are benefits to each from compliance by all,”
Murphy writes, “those benefits should be fairly distributed; and likewise for burdens.”42 With
collective consequentialism, demands are fairly distributed, as individuals are only required to
accept their fair share of the burden. Unlike act-consequentialism, collective consequentialism
does not make excessive demands on those who comply. Instead, collective consequentialism
demands the same of all individuals, regardless of whether they comply or not.43
The problem with the optimizing principle of beneficence, then, is that it cannot
circumnavigate the problem of unfair demands. “For under partial compliance with the
optimizing principle of beneficence, each agent is required to fulfill what would be his own fairly
allocated responsibility under full compliance plus (speaking roughly) some of the responsibility

41

Murphy believes that, even after placing such a high emphasis on fairness, his theory is still a consequentialist
theory. This is questionable, but cannot be questioned fully here.
42
Murphy, 90.
43
I think we can charitably assume that Murphy would say the demands are not exactly the same. A billionaire's
moral duty is significantly higher than a retail worker. The duties are the same relative to the individual's capacity
to meet these duties.
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that properly belongs to noncomplying agents.”44 Each agent, according to the collective
principle, faces the same requirements in both substance and form, as Murphy puts it. Because
each agent faces the same requirements, “no standard issue of fairness can arise.”45
A minor, but important, consideration is that the collective principle, like the optimizing
principle, is “agent-neutral.” This term, along with “agent-relative,” was first introduced by
Derek Parfit. “Since C [where C is a moral theory] gives to all agents common moral aims, I
shall call C agent-neutral. Many moral theories do not take this form. These theories are agentrelative, giving to different agents, different aims.”46 A simple example will help elucidate this
concept further. Suppose that my reason for loaning money to a friend is because doing so
would make the friend happy. My reason would be agent-relative if I want to make her happy
because she is my friend. My reason would be agent-neutral if I want to make her happy
because I ought to make other people happy, regardless of their relation to me. So, on the agentneutral account, I would have no more reason to loan money to my friend than to a stranger if it
would make them equally happy. Both the optimizing and collective principles of beneficence
follow this agent-neutral approach. Now that I have fully outlined the demandingness objections
and Murphy’s attempted response to them, I will evaluate this attempted response.

44

Murphy, 90.
Murphy, 90.
46
Parfit, 27.
45
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CHAPTER 2- AGAINST THE COMPLIANCE CONDITION
2.1 Objections to Murphy
Murphy's compliance condition is a necessary facet of collective consequentialism, but it
is problematic in many situations. To remind the reader, Murphy defines the compliance
condition as “the idea is that the demands on a complying person should not exceed what they
would be under full compliance.”47
A slight alteration to Singer's drowning child thought experiment will assist us here.
Imagine that you and a stranger are walking past a shallow pond in which two small children are
drowning. You and the stranger can easily save one child each without sacrificing anything of
comparable moral value—perhaps you will each ruin your new pairs of shoes, but surely that
price is worth paying for the life of a child. Instead of each saving one child, though, you wade
into the pond as the stranger walks away. You can easily save both of the children. What does
morality require of you in this situation? According to the optimizing principle of beneficence,
you are morally required to save both of the children. According to the collective principle of
beneficence, though, it seems that morality requires you to save one child, as only one child is
your “fair share.”
This simple example is highly problematic for collective consequentialism. Surely your
saving both of the children—even if only saving one is doing your fair share—is the best
consequence in this situation. So if we are considering among several consequentialist moral
theories, collective consequentialism seems to fail in getting us to the best outcome considered in

47

Murphy, 7.
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terms of consequences. The same can be said, then, when this thought experiment is applied to
world poverty. If you know that others will not give their fair share, but you know that you can
pick up the slack by giving more than your fair share without sacrificing anything of morally
comparable value, then in order to bring about the best consequences you are required to give
more than your fair share.
In addition, significant problems are raised by Murphy's notion of fairness. Murphy
considers one such problem, but quickly dismisses it. If we take collective consequentialism to
be correct, issues of fairness can still be raised. A complying agent in a world of noncompliers is
less well-off than she would be if she decided not to comply. For example, if a complying agent
donates her fair share to charity, but nobody else donates their fair share, the complying agent is
made less well-off relative to noncomplying agents. She is also less well-off than she would
have been had she not complied. Surely, though, she is better off than she would have been had
she complied with the optimizing principle of beneficence. By just giving her fair share, she
avoided the over-demanding, alienating, and confining results of the optimizing principle of
beneficence. Thus, the collective principle lessens the level of unfairness by lessening the
burdens accepted by compliers and noncompliers, but does not eliminate unfairness altogether.

2.2 Murphy's Possible Response
In defense of his collective principle of beneficence, Murphy can offer a response that
avoids at least some of the deeply counterintuitive implications in pond scenarios. The collective
principle of beneficence might require that I save the second drowning child, even if I have done

16
my fair share and others have not. It might after all be the case that rescuing the second child
does not in fact make me less well-off than I would be had everyone acted in accordance with the
collective principle. If saving the second child leaves you no less well-off than you would have
been under full compliance, Murphy can say that you ought to save the second child. This might
be the case in some situations, and Murphy would be correct in pointing out that the collective
principle of beneficence can require the saving of the second drowning child in these situations.
However, the (non-collective) consequentialist has no reason to say that I might be required to
save the second drowning child. Rather, the (non-collective) consequentialist only has good
reason to make the stronger claim that I am required to save the second drowning child, based on
comparing the consequences of saving the second child and the consequences of not saving the
second child.
To further elucidate my response to Murphy's possible reply, let us slightly alter the
drowning child example yet again. You and a stranger are walking past the two drowning
children, just as before. Again, the stranger runs off, and you are left with the choice to save one,
both, or neither child. You immediately wade in, saving the first drowning child. Your
expensive shoes are ruined, but they are nowhere near as morally valuable as a child's life. So
far, so good: you have brought about the most beneficial consequences with your action, and are
just as well-off as you would be under conditions of full compliance. At this point, you are
perfectly capable of saving the second drowning child. But saving the second child will require
that you pull her out of the water with your left hand—as the first child is being held in your
right hand—ruining the expensive watch on your left wrist. The proper action, especially from a
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consequentialist perspective, is to save the second drowning child as well. Just as the first child's
life has far more moral worth than your shoes, the second child's life has far more moral worth
than your watch. Those who find Singer’s original pond scenario compelling should, I think,
also find my modifications compelling.
Even though Murphy's collective principle of beneficence may sometimes require us to
save the second drowning child, this appears to be a clear case in which it does not. Remember,
the compliance condition states that “the demands on a complying person should not exceed
what they would be under full compliance.”48 Under full compliance, your shoes would be
ruined, but your expensive watch would not be, as the stranger would have rescued the second
drowning child. The stranger, had he complied, would have only ruined his pair of shoes as well,
leaving you both with comparable material losses under full compliance. Under partial
compliance, in which the stranger runs off leaving you to save both children, both your shoes and
watch are ruined, but nothing of the stranger's is ruined. It is clear that morality's demands
according to collective consequentialism in this case are to save only the one child. If one is
already a consequentialist, and thus is only concerned with the consequences of a given action,
there appears to be no reason to accept Murphy's collective consequentialism in this instance.
And if there is no reason to accept Murphy's collective consequentialism in this instance, there
appears to be no reason to accept it for duties of assistance to the extreme poor, or morality writ
large.
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2.3 Cohen’s Response
L. Jonathan Cohen offers a similar (though less developed) version of the fair shares
argument in his 1981 article “Who is starving whom?”49 Cohen’s argument differs from
Murphy’s in two significant ways. First, Cohen argues for a fair distribution of duties rather than
a fair distribution of demands. Second, Cohen’s appeals to fairness rely on the consequences of
adopting a code of ethics that emphasizes fairness. In other words, Cohen offers a
consequentialist account of fairness itself. This second difference allows Cohen to respond to the
objections above in a way that is not available to Murphy, as Murphy does not justify fairness in
terms of its consequences alone. In this section, I will show that modifying Murphy’s account of
fairness to be more in line with Cohen’s would raise more problems, not less. Because of this,
Cohen’s formulation does not save collective consequentialism as it, too, fails to provide good
enough reasons to consider fairness an important part of consequentialism.
Concerning the first major difference, it seems clear enough that whether we focus on the
fair distribution of demands or the fair distribution of duties, the criticisms I mention above
apply. Concerning the second, it is unclear whether or not Murphy’s theory ceases to be a
consequentialist theory because of the way in which he defends his account of fairness. The
same cannot be said for Cohen’s version, which is defended on the grounds that adopting a
public code of fairness brings about greater net-benefit.
Based on this second major difference between Cohen and Murphy, Cohen offers a
response to the fair-shares-in-drowning-babies objection. Cohen’s response appeals to the
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consequences of a public ethical code of fairness. Referring to an optimizing principle of
beneficence,50 Cohen writes that “such a principle in the community’s acknowledged moral code
could encourage many to believe that the world would be no worse off if they contributed
nothing at all.”51 An optimizing principle of beneficence, then, encourages compliers to pick up
the slack for non-compliers, and thus encourages non-compliers to keep on slacking. It is not
that fairness will always lead to better consequences, as that is clearly not the case. Cohen’s
claim is that we can adopt (as a group) a rule requiring that each individual do her fair share, and
adopting such a rule would bring about better consequences than not adopting such a rule.52
Cohen’s argument does not avoid the criticisms of Murphy’s argument. Cohen’s
argument also faces some serious additional criticism that Murphy can avoid. Defending rules of
fairness on consequentialist grounds opens Cohen to the familiar collapse objection levied at
rule-consequentialist theories.53 The collapse objection states that act- and ruleconsequentialism, in David Lyons’ formulation, are “extensionally equivalent.”54 In J.J.C.
Smart’s summary of Lyons’ argument,
Suppose that an exception to rule R produces the best possible consequences.
Then this is evidence that rule R should be modified so as to allow this exception.
Thus we get a new rule of the form ‘do R except in circumstances of the sort C’.
That is, whatever would lead the act-utilitarian to break a rule would lead
the…rule-utilitarian to modify the rule. Thus an adequate rule-utilitarianism
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would be extensionally equivalent to act-utilitarianism.55
If this objection is correct, it certainly undermines Cohen’s defense of fairness. “Do your fair
share,” when justified by consequentialist reasons, is just another rule of rule-consequentialism.
Certainly there are situations in which breaking the fairness rule is beneficial—either by doing
more or less than your fair share—and in these situations appeals to fairness ought to be thrown
out. I do not intend what I have just said to be definitive, and there are certainly responses to this
objection that I cannot address here.56 It is just important to note that this is the most significant
way that Cohen’s account differs from Murphy, leaving Cohen open to all of my criticisms of
Murphy, plus one, and this one additional criticism is quite important.
In situations such as global poverty, Cohen asks: “Who is morally responsible for these
deaths? Those who didn’t give anything at all or those who, knowing that the others were giving
nothing, gave no more than their tithe?”57 Cohen seems to want to treat this “or” as representing
an exclusive disjunction: either those who gave their tithe are morally responsible, or those who
gave nothing are responsible, but there is no shared responsibility. It seems far more plausible to
treat this as an inclusive disjunction, giving us a third option: both those who gave their tithe and
those who gave nothing are morally responsible for the deaths of those in extreme poverty.
Cohen rejects assigning any share of the moral responsibility to those who already gave their fair
share. “If we were to assign any share of moral responsibility to those who gave their tithe we
should implicitly be proposing a code of ethics that would undermine the motivation to make any
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kind of contribution.”58 If doing more than one’s fair share is actually harmful in this way, what
we commonly view as supererogatory would actually be morally impermissible. Put simply,
doing more than your fair share causes harmful downstream effects; it is morally impermissible
(for the consequentialist) to cause harmful downstream effects; therefore it is morally
impermissible to do more than your fair share.59 This would strike most moral philosophers—
Murphy and I included—as quite wrong.
This leaves us with a major empirical question: Would giving more than one’s fair share
in fact discourage others from giving any at all? It seems plausible to think that a non-complying
individual will actually be encouraged to do more than her fair share when she sees that those
around her are doing a great deal more than their fair share, provided that those around her have
not completely remedied the situation, and that her contribution will make a difference. In fact,
there is recent empirical evidence that supports this claim.60 Singer’s most recent book on the
topic—and the accompanying website—encourages people to donate more than their fair share,
then make their charitable contributions public as a way to encourage others to do the same.
A rule such as “do your fair share” appears far too broad. There are some situations in
which doing your fair share will lead to the best outcomes, but certainly there are others in which
doing your fair share will lead to worse outcomes than optimizing. Concerning charitable
contributions to fight global poverty, it is likely that encouraging a public ethic of doing more
than one’s fair share will bring about greater consequences than encouraging a public ethic of
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doing merely one’s fair share (though I do admit that this is speculative, as is Cohen’s argument).
The question of what publicly accepted level of contributions will lead to the greatest net benefit
is a complex one, but we have strong empirical reasons to believe that the answer is some figure
greater than your fair share.61 Murphy is willing to admit this, and defends the collective
principle of beneficence in spite of this fact. Cohen’s argument, though, runs into major
problems because of this.
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CHAPTER 3- PRACTICAL PROBLEMS FOR COLLECTIVE CONSEQUENTIALISM
3.1 The Wrong Facts Objection
Tim Mulgan, in The Demands of Consequentialism, argues that collective
consequentialism faces what Mulgan calls the “wrong facts objection.”62 This objection, put
most simply, states that the facts used by the collective consequentialism to answer the empirical
question “What should we do here and now?” are morally irrelevant facts.
Mulgan walks the reader through several hypothetical scenarios in an attempt to show
that some facts needed by collective consequentialism are morally irrelevant. An affluent
individual—let’s call her Mary—is attempting to decide what morality demands of her in
relation to the world’s poor. Mary does not know which of these three situations she is in:
1) There are only 1 million people starving in an affluent world.
2) There are 50 million people starving or facing famine.
3) Famine has broken out across Asia. There are 2,500 million people starving.63
The number of starving people is vastly different in each situation. This has a significant impact
on what Mary ought to do, assuming that the number of affluent people capable of assisting
remains constant in the three situations. Mary’s fair share, calculated rather crudely in only
financial terms, equals the amount of money it takes to solve the problem divided by the number
of people in a position to assist. The cost of eradicating famine in situation three is 2,500 times
more than in situation one, so Mary ought to contribute, according to collective
consequentialism, 2,500 times more in situation three than in situation one.
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The same can be said if the number of starving people remained constant, but the number
of affluent people in a position to offer assistance varied. Take these three situations:
1) The developed world is very small, containing only 1 million people.
2) The developed world includes 50 million people.
3) Owing to rapid economic progress in China, the developed world contains 2,500 million
people.64
Like the previous examples with varying numbers of starving individuals, the varying numbers
of people in the developed world (and thereby affluent people in a position to assist) drastically
change what morality demands of us according to Murphy. Situation three requires that Mary
give 2,500 times less than the amount she would be required to give in situation one.
Mulgan finds these results objectionable. The number of people in the developed world,
and the number of people who are extremely poor, are simply morally irrelevant numbers. The
important point, Mulgan thinks, is that collective consequentialism “requires extensive
knowledge of facts that have no effect on the consequences of our actions.”65 If we assume that
Mary knows her own financial situation, knows what organization will bring about good
consequences, and knows (roughly) how much money it will take to bring about these good
consequences, it seems that she knows all of the morally relevant facts, and can now act
accordingly. Because these additional facts have to effect on the consequences of our actions,
and consequentialists are only concerned with the consequences of their actions, these additional
facts appear to be morally irrelevant for the consequentialist.
Mulgan’s argument, though, seems to take for granted—contra Murphy—that facts
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relating to the fairness of each situation are morally relevant. But Mulgan believes this because
he thinks that fairness itself is morally irrelevant, so facts relating to fairness are also morally
irrelevant. What, exactly, makes these facts “wrong” or “morally irrelevant” facts? Murphy
would of course say that these facts are not the wrong facts; rather, they are precisely the facts
that one should be concerned with in our nonideal situation of partial compliance and extreme
poverty, and these facts are required as a result of collective consequentialism. In other words,
these facts are only wrong or morally irrelevant if we accept that collective consequentialism is
wrong and act consequentialism is right. In defense of the wrong facts objection, Mulgan offers
two claims. First, Mary “should not need to acquire such detailed empirical knowledge before
she decides how much to give to charity.”66 Second, moral acceptability of a donation “should
not depend on such empirical details.”67 As Mulgan correctly notes, these claims are distinct but
mutually supportive.
The wrong facts objection is precisely right, but could use much additional support,
support I will attempt to provide. I think there are three ways we can view the wrong facts
objection, and I will discuss each of them in turn. First, these facts are in principle morally
irrelevant and, whether or not collective consequentialism requires that they be precise or just
extensive, their gathering should not be required at all. That is, even if it was incredibly easily to
attain these extensive and precise facts, they would still be in principle irrelevant. Second,
collective consequentialism requires that agents gather facts with far too much precision to be
plausible. Third, even if the fact-gathering does not have to be so precise, the additional facts are
66
67

Mulgan, 94.
Mulgan, 94.

26
extensive and difficult to attain, making the fact-gathering enterprise implausibly difficult.
The first interpretation of the wrong facts objection—that the facts are in principle
morally irrelevant—may in fact be correct. Indeed, I do think that this objection is correct, but I
think it is correct because I think collective consequentialism is wrong for reasons independent
of the wrong facts objection. It is this version of the wrong facts objection that Mulgan most
heavily relies on, but because this objection also relies on the wrongness of collective
consequentialism itself, the debate should be pushed back a step. Instead of saying that the facts
are morally irrelevant and therefore collective consequentialism is wrong, we would have to say
that collective consequentialism is wrong and therefore the facts are morally irrelevant. I believe
I have provided enough reason above to affirm the antecedent of the latter conditional.
The second construal of the wrong facts objection—that these additional facts require
implausible precision—can, I think, be easily defeated. This precision objection has also been
commonly leveled against other forms of consequentialism, most notably act utilitarianism. Act
utilitarians need not, and should not, require that agents in practice obtain all relevant facts
before acting. This would be counterproductive and would fail to meet the requirement to
maximize utility. Surely if an agent remains frozen, unable to act until she has collected every
relevant fact and calculated precisely the morally best option, she is failing to be a good
utilitarian. She should instead act on the basis of the best available information, weighing the
costs of pursuing new information against the benefits of acting without this new information.
This can be supported on strictly utilitarian grounds. The same can be said for collective
consequentialism. One can have a rough idea of what morality requires of them, and use this
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rough idea as a guide to one’s action instead of seeking out and calculating the precise demands
of morality.
The third way we can view the wrong facts objection—that these facts are implausibly
extensive—is more difficult to undermine, partially because it is the weakest version of the three
possible wrong facts objections. Because we cannot simply hold the first “morally irrelevant in
principle” objection without assuming collective consequentialism is itself wrong, the third
objection cannot provide a strong enough independent reason to reject collective
consequentialism. It can, however, show additional problems faced by collective
consequentialism, problem not faced by other forms of consequentialism.
Many have criticized Singer’s argument by pointing to the epistemic obstacles agents
face when donating to international aid organizations.68 Leif Wenar makes what I believe is the
strongest such argument, so I will focus on the argument he provides.69 The more facts a moral
theory requires an agent to know before she can act, the more Wenar’s criticisms cause serious
practical problems for that moral theory. Collective consequentialism requires that an agent
know more facts than act consequentialism. This itself is a serious strike against collective
consequentialism, and an additional reason for consequentialists to deny this specific form of
consequentialism. However, I do not intend this objection to be capable, on its own, of
providing enough reason to deny collective consequentialism.
As Wenar points out, there are significant epistemic differences between pond scenarios
68
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and contributions to international development. Singer’s presentation of a child drowning in a
pond lacks the complexities of international aid. In the pond scenario, we are in a situation
where we can take direct action, and we can reasonably assume that our action of attempting to
save the child will have the desired outcome.
There are several important and relevant dissimilarities between the pond scenario and
global poverty. One important difference—from which the other differences flow—is noted by
William Easterly, a world-renowned international development economist, in a video discussion
with Singer.70 Much of the power of the pond example is that you can act to directly save the
child without any intermediary. This is clearly not the case for the great majority of us in the
case of international aid. To make the pond scenario more analogous to contributing to
international aid, Easterly proposes the following: You are walking by a pond and you see a child
drowning. You cannot save the child, but you can pay somebody else $100 to do so. If we
accept the conclusion in the original pond scenario, there is no good reason to deny the
conclusion that you ought to pay somebody $100 to save the child. This means, however, that
you ought to pay somebody who you can be reasonably sure will actually save the child, and you
ought to make sure that the child was in fact saved. If you paid somebody $100 who you could
have reasonably known would fail to save the child, or would use the $100 to buy weapons to
kill other children, or prop up dictators, or run off with the money, you acted wrongly. The same
principle can be applied to international aid, and Singer agrees both in his discussion with
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Easterly and in his own writing.71
So, for Singer and those who advocate the optimizing principle of beneficence, we need
to know the answer to two important questions: Can my contributions help those in extreme
poverty? And, if so, What organizations (or causes, or projects) will help? Similar questions
raised in the original pond scenario are answered quite easily: Of course you can do something to
save the drowning child, and the “something” that you can do is simply lift the child out of the
water. Wenar is right in arguing that these questions are far more difficult in the international aid
case, and he provides quite a bit of empirical information to support these claims. I will not
recite these empirical claims made by Wenar and others here, as it is not a matter of much
controversy that international aid, non-governmental organizations, international economic
development, etc. are complex matters, much more complex than the pond scenario.72
It is important to note that Wenar does not provide a reason to think that Singer’s moral
premises are false. Rather, Wenar just aims to show that the situation is more complex than
Singer seems to indicate. Wenar, then, poses the donor’s question: “How will each dollar I give
to aid, or each hour I can devote campaigning for aid, affect the long-term well-being of people
in other countries?”73 This is a difficult question to answer, but one that I think can be answered
with a reasonable degree of certainty by Singer. There are some aid efforts that are clearly
harmful—for example, shipping food from the United States to extremely poor countries,
thereby destroying local business (or preventing these local businesses from arising in the first
71
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place). But those like Easterly—cited approvingly by Wenar—argue that there are approaches to
international aid that do work, we know with reasonable certainty which approaches work, and
we should guide of efforts within these approaches.74
Just because it is difficult to know which aid efforts will help, or which will help more
than harm, does not undermine Singer’s moral premise: “If it is in our power to prevent
something very bad happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral
significance, we ought to do it.”75 The issue is empirical and practical, accepting Singer’s moral
premise and attempting to do the most good with our actions. It is incredibly implausible to
think that there is nothing that we can do (through financial contributions, fighting for political
reforms, volunteering, etc.) to assist those in extreme poverty. Both Wenar and Easterly are more
skeptical of much international aid than Singer, but all three acknowledge that more attention
needs to be given to the effects of this aid and how aid can be improved.
Wenar’s epistemic concerns, then, are significant obstacles for Singer, but obstacles that
can be avoided through additional research (such as that conducted by Easterly) and careful
giving in accordance with this research. However, the more knowledge is required of us, the
more problematic Wenar’s epistemic concerns become. Murphy’s collective consequentialism,
as we have seen, requires that an agent be aware of additional complex facts before she can know
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what her obligations are.76
Murphy’s collective consequentialism brings us much closer to the “paralysis of analysis”
that Wenar warns us of.77 I think it is plausible to imagine that, if one were to follow Murphy’s
collective principle of beneficence, she would never actually have to contribute anything to
international aid. Time spent researching various organizations to see which ones were worth
donating to would be considered part of one’s sacrifice to be weighed against the potential
benefits of the contribution. So, if the result of my research shows that my fair share is the
equivalent of a $100 contribution or five hours of my time,78 I would have to subtract the time
spent researching from what I owe. If, to find this rough estimate of my fair share, I spent five
hours researching, I do not have to donate anything more; I have already donated my time. It is
up to others to use the results of my research and donate the $100 effectively. One could reach
an even “rougher” amount more quickly—say, in two hours—leaving the other three hours (or
$60) to be donated. We should, however, be cautious not to let the rough estimate become so
rough that it is unhelpful, failing to guide our actions precisely enough.

3.2 Time of Assessment
An additional problem for collective consequentialism’s ability to guide our actions is the
time at which we are supposed to assess our moral demands going forward. Murphy adopts as
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his time of assessment “the rest of an agent’s life from some point forward.”79 Remember,
Murphy’s full articulation of the compliance condition is as follows:
An agent-neutral moral principle should not increase its demands on agents as
expected compliance with the principle by other agents decreases. Demands on
an agent under partial compliance should not exceed what they would be (all
other aspects of her situation remaining the same) under full compliance from now
on.80
There are several problems with collective consequentialism being completely forward looking.
For one thing, if I was born into a world that had long consisted of full compliers, my obligations
to those in extreme poverty would be nearly nonexistent, as there would not be anybody in
extreme poverty. Europe would not have used Africa as an imperialist toy; the global structure
would not be exploitative; civil wars would not be ravaging many of the poorest nations; corrupt
dictators would not violate the rights of their citizens; governmental aid would not be used as a
political tool, but instead as a means of combatting global poverty; or, even if these tragedies had
still occurred, affluent individuals would have recognized the moral tragedy of world poverty
and rectified the situation long ago.
It seems clear that, if the time of assessment is forward looking from some point, I am
picking up the slack for the noncomplying others who came before me, or from before that time
of assessment. This should be just as objectionable as picking up the slack for current and future
noncomplying agents. It may be even more objectionable to pick up the slack for past
noncomplying agents than it is for me to pick up the slack for current noncomplying agents. For
current noncomplying agents, one could plausibly defend picking up the slack on collective
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grounds different from Murphy’s: humanity is in this together, so when one person fails to
comply it is my obligation to pick up the slack. The problem of past noncompliance seems even
more objectionable if I am to pick up the slack for past noncomplying agents, specifically those
who caused these problems in the first place. Those who came before me and caused these
problems (as well as those currently in power who cause world poverty to continue) complied
with neither the optimizing nor collective principle of beneficence. By following the collective
principle of beneficence in the way Murphy describes it, I am to be very concerned about current
noncomplying agents, but wholly unconcerned about past noncomplying agents.
I see no reason to exclude past noncomplying agents from the calculation of our fair
share, especially past noncomplying agents who are still alive and thus still in a position to make
up for their past noncomplying selves. For any agent who has done less than her fair share up to
this point in her life, consideration of past noncomplying agents would have to include
consideration of her own noncompliance. Just as I see no reason to think that a living person
who greatly harmed the global poor her whole life (perhaps by helping to construct exploitative
international trade agreements) should not do more than her fair share to make up for past harms,
I see no reason to think that I should not be required to do more than my fair share to make up
for past omissions. The time assessment of “from some point forward” seems quite arbitrary.
The same can be said for agents who have done more than their fair share in the past. If I was
convinced by Singer’s argument, and acted accordingly by following the optimizing principle of
beneficence from ages 20 to 50, then read Murphy’s book at age 50, why should I do my fair
share from age 50 onward, failing to consider all that I did for the previous 30 years?
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Murphy does mention this, but seems to think it is not much of a problem, as to him “it
seems unlikely that [problems of time assessment] would greatly distort the discussion of overdemandingness” 81 and, thus, the discussion of demands under full and partial compliance. If we
shifted the time of assessment back far enough to include past, dead, noncompliers, Murphy
thinks that we would also have to shift demands onto these past, dead, noncompliers. This
would mean that less good would be done, as these dead noncompliers cannot rectify their
noncompliance and living agents would not be required to rectify the dead noncompliers’
noncompliance.
There are more than these two options, though. One can hold that demanding that the
dead pick up the slack is ridiculous while also saying that past noncompliance is an important
consideration. One could say, for example, that the colonialism of Western European countries
has caused many of the problems faced by extremely poor nations in Africa. Because of this,
perhaps we can say that an affluent British person owes more to the extremely poor in Africa
than an affluent Japanese person. The affluent Japanese person (let us assume) has not benefitted
from the past noncompliance of the British Empire, but the affluent British person has. Though
this idea cannot be fully explored here, it does not seem implausible to say that burdens of past
noncompliance can be distributed among those who have benefited most from the past
noncompliance, rather than simply distribute these burdens in “fair” shares among all affluent
people.

81

Murphy, 45.

35
3.3 Conclusion
As Mulgan correctly points out, “The war with Individual [act] Consequentialism is one
that the Collectivists cannot win.”82 If my arguments here have been sound, it should be clear
that collective consequentialism is an untenable consequentialist alternative to act
consequentialism. Murphy’s account of fairness conflicts with basic tenets of consequentialism,
leaving collective consequentialism deeply flawed. Going forward, there may be two ways to
modify Murphy’s theory. One option is to develop a more robust account of fairness that goes
beyond fairness as equality, thus giving up Murphy’s notion of fairness. The other is to hold onto
Murphy’s account of fairness, but de-consequentialize the rest of the theory. It is unclear
whether either of these options would work if attempted, but even attempting them is a task too
large to begin here. Murphy’s attempt around the demandingness objection, then, fails.
Consequentialists should seek other answers to the demandingness objection, many of which
have been proposed.83 It may be the case that another consequentialist option—act, rule,
satisficing, scalar, hybrid theories, and the list goes on—is a satisfactory account of morality,
either avoiding or defeating the demandingness objections. All I hope to have done here is help
to eliminate one option from the long list of consequentialist theories. Those convinced by a
broadly consequentialist account of morality have little reason to accept collective
consequentialism, and should look elsewhere.
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